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Abstract 
In this paper we seek to explain the emergence of different voice regimes, and to do so by using approaches 
from institutional economics.  In particular we analyse the emergence of different voice regimes as a contracting 
problem; a “make” or “buy” decision on the part of the employer.  A unique feature of the model is that the 
firm, having chosen its particular employee management regime, faces switching costs if it attempts to alter its 
original make or buy decision.  A particular dimension of the employee management regime decision is the use 
of the union as agent or supplier of voice, or elements thereof.  We argue that there are circumstances in which 
the employer may, on grounds of cost or risk, seek to subcontract aspects of the management of labour to a 
union and, further, that this (along with the presence of switching costs) helps explain the continued recognition 
of trade unions in many firms. In other circumstances, however, the employer may seek to construct voice 
mechanisms without union involvement.  Workplace data from Britain are used to test these and other 
implications of the model. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
A literature which borrows concepts from the analysis of product markets has proven fruitful 
in the analysis of labour relations.  Specifically, the translation of Hirschman’s exit-voice 
(Hirschman, 1970) balance from the analysis of firm and customer relations to labour 
relations by Freeman and Medoff has spawned an entire literature on the origins of and forms 
taken by voice mechanisms (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Mishel and Voos, 1992). 
 A feature of this literature is that voice is in demand by both employers and 
employees.  The rationale for employer demand remains that of the product market model; 
employee voice has certain beneficial effects on firm performance.  The rationale for 
employee demand has changed slightly.  In addition to the beneficial impact of voice on the 
employment experience and the avoidance of costly exit, there is also the essentially political 
idea of the positive affect attached to representation in the workplace (Freeman and Rogers, 
1999; Towers, 1997).  In addition to any economic utility to be derived, voice has 
psychological benefits which may vary according to the form voice takes. 
 In the original formulation (Freeman and Medoff, 1984) voice was identified with 
union presence.  However, beginning with an early critique by Addison (1985) and followed 
by the growth in the analysis of human resource management, there has been a growing 
literature on different voice mechanisms, based on the proposition that there may be a variety 
of such mechanisms available to satisfy employer and employee demand which are not 
coterminous with union activity.  And, indeed, survey evidence in Britain and USA shows 
that there is variance in the distribution of voice; specifically, both the incidence of employee 
voice and its forms appear to vary across employers.  This variance has not been well 
explained and is the focus of this paper. 
 We seek to explain the emergence of different voice regimes, and to do so by also 
using approaches from institutional economics.  In particular we wish to analyse the 
emergence of different voice regimes as a contracting problem; a make or buy decision on the 
part of the employer.  A particular dimension of this decision is the use of the union as agent 
or supplier of voice regimes, or elements thereof.  We argue that there are circums tances in 
which the employer may, on grounds of cost or risk, seek to subcontract aspects of the 
management of labour to a union and, further, that this helps explain the continued 
recognition of trade unions in many firms.  In other circumstances, however, the employer 
may seek to construct voice mechanisms without union involvement. 
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 The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 discusses the proximate influences 
on voice regimes, arguing the necessary preliminary that employer choice is a prime 
determinant.  Section 3 discusses the factors influencing employer decision making - 
particularly what we characterise as the ‘make or buy’ decision, which generates inter- firm 
variance - and develops propositions.  Sections 4 and 5 look at empirical evidence on changes 
to voice regimes in Britain, using WERS data.  Section 6 assesses implications. 
 
 
2. Union and Non-Union Voice Options 
 
The probability of union voice within an establishment may be defined in terms of the values 
of and relationships between the following three variables. 
(a) Employee propensity to join a union (M)  
(b) Union propensity to organise a workplace (U) 
(c) Employer propensity to deal with a union (E) 
 
Union voice may be generated by several combinations of employer, union and employee 
action.  It might be the case that employees become active around a grievance or set of 
grievances and seek out a union to join.  It may be that a union focuses organising activity on 
a workplace.  It may be that an employer pre-emptively recognises a union which then 
recruits.  These are the simplest cases and the three proximate influences on recognition 
probably operate in complex and varied combinations in practice.   
 The possible combinations of E, U and M at any point in time are presented in Figure 
1.  Their characteristics are as follows: 
 
1. E+,U+, M+; there is consensus between all parties about the desirability of union 
voice. 
2. E+,U+, M- ; the employer sees the need for union voice and the union is willing to 
be recognised but there are low membership levels, perhaps because the 
establishment is a greenfield site. 
3. E+,U-, M+;  the employer wishes to have union voice and the membership levels 
are high but the union does not regard the proposed bargaining unit as financially 
viable. 
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4. E+,U-, M-; only the employer is enthusiastic.  A typical case might be where the 
employer proposes a redundancy and wishes to have a union co-operate in it to 
ensure legality, but the union does not wish to be drawn in and employees do not 
see the union as offering job security or other benefits. 
5. E-, U+, M+; the union has high membership levels and is pursuing recognition 
from a recalcitrant employer. 
6. E-, U-, M+; there are high membership levels but employers and union are 
unenthusiastic; it may be that the union regards the probability of continued 
employer recalcitrance as high and the proposed bargaining unit inviable on those 
grounds (Willman, 2001). 
 
This is a static view, and dynamics are dealt with below.  All combinations are logically 
possible; arguably, none is empirically unlikely although it is difficult to estimate relative 
frequencies. 
 
Union voice is likely, with differing probabilities, in four combinations; 
 E+,U+, M+    
 E+,U+, M-    
 E+,U-,  M+    
 E-, U+, M+  
 
Non union voice is likely in the following combinations 
 E-, U-, M- 
  E-, U-, M+ 
E-, U+, M- 
E+, U-, M- 
 
The pattern thus broadly dichotomises on employer preference1 except in the two sets 
highlighted: 
 
                                                 
1 It also dichotomises broadly on union preferences; the issues involved here are dealt with elsewhere (Willman, 
2001). 
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E-, U+, M+; where the recalcitrant employer is pressured for union voice by both union and 
employees. 
 
 E+, U-, M-; where the employer, in the terms used below, wishes to subcontract voice 
production but has no counterparty. 
 
We argue that employer preferences are empirically unstable in both cases.  In the first, 
pressure, often supported by statute, overcomes employer opposition.  In the second, apathy 
leads to a choice of non-union voice or no voice.  A category of employers may exist for 
whom the benefits of voice are outweighed by the costs of its provision (Millward et al, 
2000).  In summary, employer preference for a particular voice regime is likely to be a prime 
factor in its emergence.  Employer preferences may change, but we will argue below that 
there is a stickiness to regime choice based on switching costs. 
 There are empirical as well as theoretical reasons for allowing the primacy of 
employer choice in regime definition.  First, employer preferences do appear to influence 
differences in unionisation at the national level, particularly between US and Europe.  
Second, there is evidence that employees are influenced in their voice preferences by the 
probability that the chosen mechanism will meet with employer approval (Freeman and 
Rogers, 1999; Diamond and Freeman, 2001).  Third, unions are financially employer 
dependent to the extent that the viability of any union based voice regime depends on 
employer support (Willman et al, 1993).   
 Two limitations of the approach emerge.  First, employer discretion is the premise of 
employer choice; where union voice is statutory, the approach is of little use.  Second, 
employers who are not in the voice market are excluded.  They are dealt with in a separate 
paper (Gomez et al, 2002).  We now turn to consideration of the factors influencing regime 
choice. 
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3. Making or Buying 
 
3.1  Theoretical considerations 
 
Our approach in this section relies on transaction cost economics and institutional theory.  In 
essence, we focus on boundedly rational choice by employers who subsequently face high 
switching costs. 
 Transaction cost economics suggest that in exchanges characterised by asset 
specificity, frequency of interaction and uncertainty, choices about transaction governance 
structures are required, in particular, the choice whether to make or buy, or, more accurately, 
own or contract.  All else equal, the more idiosyncratic the investments, the greater the 
frequency of interaction (and duration of exchange) and the greater the uncertainty facing the 
buyer, hierarchy rather than market will be preferred (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991).  The 
vertical integration decision by the firm is paradigmatic 
 This choice of governance mechanism is made by parties operating under bounded 
rationality, faced with the possibility of seller opportunism2, and operating on a risk neutral 
basis.  The unit of analysis is the transaction, and variance in governance modes generated by 
variance in and interaction between boundedness of rationality, trust between parties (i.e.  
expectation of opportunism) and risk preference is not explored.  The model thus has 
problems explaining the continued existence of different governance modes for similar 
transactions.  The paradigmatic case is the difference in vertical integration between Ford and 
GM.  Ecological analysis of organisational populations manifesting such variance has to rely 
on unsatisfactory assertions of disequilibrium. 
 Where one allows for such variance (as in Chiles and McMackin, 1996) one in effect 
shifts the unit of analysis from ecological to cognitive, focusing directly on managerial 
decision making and operating with a subjective conception of costs, i.e.  as experienced by 
managerial decision makers.  Focusing on conditions at the moment of regime choice allows 
consideration of different patterns among the three actor variables, but at the expense of 
predictive power.  However, it also allows consideration of cohort effects and switching 
costs. 
 
                                                 
2  Little changes under the assumption of bilateral opportunism (Willman, 1982).   
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We can read this over into the analysis of employment regimes in the following way.  With 
no idiosyncracy, single interactions (the temporary employee paid by the piece) and no 
uncertainty, the employer will not want voice; the classic example might be the longshore 
hiring hall.  However, the employer wanting voice faces a governance choice problem when 
seeking to ‘purchase’ a voice – producing workforce.  ‘Making’, involves full provision of 
those mechanisms which might engender employee voice, including those perceived as 
legitimate by employees.  Specifically, this would involve full provision of non-union voice.  
‘Buying’ would, in extremis, involve the subcontracting out to a union of all aspects of voice 
provision.  Hybrid and intermediate forms, which involve a mixture of union and non-union 
voice, are possible and might be differentiated in terms of variance in the nature of the 
transaction (asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty) or of the purchasing party 
(boundedness of rationality, expectation of opportunism and risk preference). 
 Where voice is not chosen, it may be assumed either that the employer is not 
concerned by employee exit, or that the costs of voice exceed those of exit.  Where voice is 
chosen, we conceptualise the employer options within the transaction costs framework as 
follows 
 
(a) Buy (i.e. union U) 
This is closest to the Freeman and Medoff view of voice where the employer subcontracts 
to one or more unions the responsibility for the generation of voice.  This involves, in 
Williamson’s terms, a long term relational contract in which the employers direct costs in 
the production of voice are low but the risks of supplier opportunism are high. 
 
(b) Make (i.e. non-union, N) 
This is akin to the ‘sophisticated HRM’ approach and involves employers choosing 
directly to provide a set of employee voice mechanisms excluding third party 
intervention.  Direct costs are correspondingly higher and, while there is a risk that the 
approach may not generate the voice required, there are no counterparty risks.   
 
(c) Hedge (i.e. dual channel D) 
Following Williamson (1991) we include a mixed option in which union and non-union 
voice mechanisms co-exist.  This may be seen as a form of employer hedging, attempting 
to control both cost and risk.  For simplicity, we treat this as a single option in what 
follows, acknowledging that a range of hybrids is possible across firms. 
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We consider the choice between these options in terms of three dimensions 3: probability of 
regime success, gross return and total cost.  At time zero, or period t=0, the choice 
framework is the following: 
 
(1) jiV = 
j
i
j
i
j
i CR -q  
 
Where 
j
iq  = probability that an employee management regime for employer i will meet with 
success4, which inversely proxies the risk associated with regime choice, where j = (U,N,D) 
indexes the three voice regimes described above 
j
iR  = gross return or benefit from voice regime adoption 
j
iC = the administrative cost of providing or purchasing voice regime j. 
 
A rational employer, i, will adopt the voice regime with the greatest net benefit *iV  Thus, 
‘buying’ occurs when:  
 
(2) *i
U
i VV ³   
 
This implies that the condition for the adoption of union voice is given by 
 
(3) 
U
i
U
iU
i R
C
>q . 
 
The right-hand side of equation (2) defines a critical value for the probability of an employer 
adopting union voice.  The critical value is 
 
(4) 
U
i
U
i
i R
C
=*q , 
                                                 
3 This is an extension of the Farber and Western (2002) model. 
4 Where success is measured from management’s perspective along a variety dimensions related to the ability of 
the voice regime to elicit employee behaviours that are favourable to productivity. 
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and unions will successfully target employers for whom *i
U
i qq ³ .  Assuming 
j
iR is the same 
for all forms of voice - i.e., voice is an experience good residing in a ‘solution market’ that 
may be secured equally through a variety of institutions5 - the key variables are risk and cost.   
 The key risk item for non-union voice 
*U
iq  is the probability that the firm will be able 
to hire voice-production specialists and generate institutional forms which elicit voice 
without the existence of a third, independent party.  The key risk item for q Ni   is the 
probability that the firm will find a non-opportunistic or incompetent counterparty.  Where 
both risks are high, for example where personnel specialists are rare and unions militant or 
too weak to deliver voice, the firm may hedge and go for the hybrid option q Di .6  
 The key cost items are as in Figure 2, which depicts hypothetical firm A in three 
possible states.  In reverse order, in case 3, the firm experiences UiC  having entered a long 
term relational voice contract with a reliable union (q u=1).  If the union becomes less able to 
elicit voice and/or more militant, the firm may seek - providing that HRM itself is a reliable 
alternative (q N=1) - to move to case 1, with costs NiC ; this could occur through de-
recognition.  Where union and non-union prospects are equally risky(q u=q N=1) the firm 
may seek to “hedge” and adopt a dual channel of union and non-union voice with costs DiC , 
as in case two.  The figure also outlines the variable elements of any jiC .  They are, for all, 
market wage and administrative costs (a ), the former assumed regime independent and the 
latter regime dependent.  For both UiC and 
D
iC , there is the possibility of a wage mark up (d) 
variations in which might generate regime switching behaviour.  Note tha t the ‘pure’ 
administrative cost of voice a1 is highest in the make case and lowest in the ‘pure’ buy case.  
Hedging, the highest cost option is also the lowest risk. 
 
3.2  Regime switching 
 
Two implications emerge.  First, this logic indicates that switches from wholly union to 
wholly non-union voice (or the reverse) are less likely than a switch from either to a dual 
                                                 
5 See Bryson and Gomez (2002) and Lambin (1997). 
6 In all three cases one can see the experiential characteristics of voice provision (i.e., the fact that any form of 
voice necessitates a trial or sampling period before the payoff can be accurately assessed).  This is why voice 
regimes are experience goods for employers as well as employees (see Gomez and Gunderson, 2002 and Bryson 
and Gomez, 2002).   
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channel.  If one form of voice provision is unsatisfactory (perhaps because the union is 
unreliable) or too costly (perhaps because of the number of personnel specialists required) 
then hedging to a dual channel is more likely than abandonment of sunk costs. 
 Several factors might induce switch.  Union voice is fragile with low union 
membership, interruptions to voice supply (strikes), where the administrative costs rise or 
where for reasons of competition the firm negatively evaluates the equal supply of union 
voice to all competitors.  Non-union voice is fragile where there are capability or cost 
questions, where the union wage premium disappears or where employer-made voice is not 
viewed as legitimate by employees.  An interesting paradox emerges.  In Britain and the 
United States, there is evidence that the union wage premium has fallen (Blanchflower and 
Bryson, 2003; Hildreth, 1999).  In addition, over the last two decades, the number of strikes 
has fallen; i.e. Cui has fallen and q ui   has increased.  However, there is little evidence of a 
switch to union voice.   
 This raises the second implication of Figure 2.  We argue for the existence of 
switching costs ( jtS 1+ ) once a voice regime is adopted (in period t =1).  Switching costs 
encourage inertia; hence movements away from an existing form of voice for an established 
employer are less likely than the adoption of alternative forms of voice by newly established 
firms.  The voice-regime choice model (1) can therefore be re-written as  
 
(5) ji
j
i
j
i
j
i
j
it SCRV +-=+ q1   
 
where an employer will once again desire union voice if *i
U
i VV ³ , and remain unionised even 
if a better non-union alternative exists.  Persistence in the face of better alternatives occurs as 
long as switching costs remain greater than the net-benefits of changing voice regimes,  
 
(6) Ui
U
t VVS ->+
*
1 .   
 
This explains why employers often stick with their original voice-regime decisions and why 
switching does not occur simply because expected net benefits are positive (as would be the 
case if equation (1) were in effect).  The ability of this modelling framework to explain the 
broad patterns of voice regime adoption in Britain is elaborated below. 
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3.3  Interfirm heterogeneity 
 
Voice mechanisms are experience goods operating in solution markets.  They comprise a 
range of institutional options for securing employee compliance, retention, motivation and 
information sharing.  Although we have assumed any combination of options can secure jiR , 
the value of jiR may be greater for some firms than others.
7  This can be conceptualised 
within this framework in terms of asset specificity.  Where the employer experiences 
substantial exit costs and where the value of information sharing is high, for example where 
the workforce is highly skilled, the employer will be able to generate high jiR  and thus 
endure higher jiC .   
 However, differences in risk preference may generate further variance.  Chiles and 
McMackin (1996) argue that variable risk preferences will generate variable institutional 
choice within otherwise identical firms.  Put another way, for them jiq is a subjective 
probability.  Firms with an aversion to risk may opt for NiV  where cheaper options exist 
because of an overestimation of union risk.  Similarly, risk seeking firms may retain UiV  
where asset specificity might predict choice of NiV ; options are depicted in Figure 3.   
 The figure (adapted from Chiles and McMackin, 1996) assumes a single curve for the 
‘make’ decision (M).  The curves O-RA,O-RN AND O-RS depict the risk-averse, risk-
neutral and risk-seeking employer respectively.  If a firm is located below (above) the M 
curve, it will always choose to buy (make) voice.  However, as asset specificity increases 
(moving from point a to e along the 0-RA curve), firms who buy will endure higher costs of 
voice provision (C1> C0) than those making, thus ensuring a switch to the internal HRM 
option (A1 to A0).  As is also shown, risk averse employers will adopt the non-union voice 
option at lower levels of asset specificity than risk-seeking ones (A0 < A3).  What would 
differentiate such risk preferences?  In this case, one could argue that firms facing higher 
levels of product market risk are likely to act in a risk-averse manner.  This is essent ially a 
risk appetite argument, (Adams, 1995) based on the neutral assumption of equal risk 
appetites. 
 
 
                                                 
7 This is partly why we have insisted on retaining the subscript i throughout the modelling. 
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3.4  Field effects 
 
So far, we have dealt with endogenous influences on decision making about voice regimes.  
However, there are likely to be environmental or field effects.  Under the assumption of 
bounded rationality, one might expect employer choice to be influenced by legislation on the 
employment relationship (coercive pressure), by the availability of existing voice solutions 
provided by labour market groups or institutions (normative pressure) and by knowledge of 
the behaviour of other firms (mimetic pressures).  All such pressures are likely to be 
isomorphic, i.e. towards conformity with existing practice (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
However, there is evidence based in the application of institutional theory to the employment 
field that specific labour-market adaptations can be prompted by trigger events generating the 
diffusion of new ‘solutions’ to labour management problems (Dobbin et al, 1993). 
 We suggest that field level effects will influence employer choice of voice regime.  
Specifically, we identify 
 
1. Cohort effects; the employer’s choice of voice regime reflects the balance of coercive 
and normative isomorphic pressures at the time of regime selection. 
2. Composition effects; the employer’s choice of voice regime reflects the balance of 
available comparators to be imitated (mimetic pressure) at the point of regime 
selection. 
 
To summarise; we argue that voice regimes reflect choices made by boundedly rational 
employers.  They may be compared with make or buy decisions made under uncertainty and 
isomorphic pressures.  Once made, switching costs are high.  We now turn to empirical 
evidence to test the set of propositions which emerge from this approach.  These are; 
 
1. Employers are risk averse and tend to choose dominant voice regime options.   
2. Regime switching is rare because switching costs are high so, once chosen, regimes 
tend to ‘stick’.  Where switching does occur, it usually involves hedging to dual 
channels to spread ‘risk’.  Radical switches between union and non-union voice are 
less frequent. 
3. There are thus cohort effects in regime provision with change generated by new 
entrants, so compositional effects accompany the cohort effect.   
4. The incentive for ‘first moving’ is often asset specificity.   
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5. Risk averse employers will be particularly likely to follow mimetic pressures.   
6. Higher levels of product market risk are associated with risk aversion in regime 
selection. 
 
We now turn to empirical analysis. 
 
 
4. What Has Happened to Voice Regimes? 
 
The high-tide of workplace- level union recognition in Britain was the 1950s (Millward et al, 
2000:  101-102; Machin, 2000).  Data available since 1984 show a steep decline in union-
only voice arrangements, and a less marked decline in ‘dual-channel’ voice involving union 
and non-union channels in combination.  These two changes were offset by a steep increase 
in voice arrangements that did not involve unions.  We depict these changes in terms of our 
framework in Figure 4.  It is striking that, although the forms of voice regime chosen by 
employers have changed markedly across the period, the balance between those wanting a 
voice regime and those choosing ‘no voice’ workplaces have remained stable.   
 In fact, the majority of unionised workplaces have combined union and non-union 
voice since the early 1980s (Table1).  Dual channel voice predominated in 1984 even among 
those workplaces set up in the 1950s (see below), suggesting that it may have been the 
dominant regime for some time.  However, the adoption of non-union voice by unionised 
workplaces became increasingly common in the 1980s and 1990s.   
 
 
5. Assessing the Propositions 
 
So, there are clear trends in the aggregate, with a shift from buying to making.  In this 
section, we look more closely at the propositions outlined above.  We find evidence of cohort 
and compositional effects.  Radical shifting seems rare; hedging to dual channel regimes less 
so.  We also find evidence of first mover asset specificity and the effects of product market 
risk on regime choice. 
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5.1  Regime switching and hedging 
 
For the 1990s, we can gain insight into how regime changes occurred through the analysis of 
panel data for workplaces surviving over the period, coupled with data on workplace closures 
and new workplaces.8  
 Table 2 shows the incidence of regime switching among workplaces surviving over 
the period 1990-1998 and, for those who did switch, it shows initial and end regimes.  Under 
a third of workplaces (29.5%) switched regimes.  Of those who did switch, 42% moved to 
dual channel arrangements, hedging the risk attached to a single channel regime. 
 8.7% of workplaces switched out of union-only regimes.  These switches out of 
union-only status outstripped the in-flow (8.7% versus 1.9%) resulting in a net reduction in 
union-only regimes among continuing workplaces.  The stickiness of union regimes is 
confirmed by the rarity of union derecognition, which occurred in 5.2% of cases (or 9.2% of 
instances in which workplaces had started out with a union in 1990) (see Millward et al, 
2000:  125).9 
 During the 1990s, the decline in union-only voice was largely accounted for by 
continuing workplaces switching from single-channel union representation to dual-channel 
arrangements (Millward et al, 2000:  124-125).  Although new workplaces were not adopting 
union-only regimes, they only accounted for 28% of all workplaces extant at the end of the 
1990s, making change within continuing workplaces the dominant factor (Millward et al, 
2000:  8).   
 So why has there been such a big switch away from union-only to dual channel voice 
regimes? The evidence suggests that employers were hedging against the increased risk of 
union-only voice delivering effectively for them.  First, the decline in union density within 
unionised workplaces (Millward et al, 2000:  139-145) made it more difficult for unions to 
operate as effective agents for employers.  Second, national and sectoral- level collective 
bargaining - arrangements which had effectively removed pay as a source of competitive 
advantage - became much less prevalent (Millward et al, 2000:  185-196).  As a consequence, 
employer support for unionisation declined over the period (Gallie et al, 1998:  107; Millward 
et al, 2000: 145-149; Bryson, 2001).  This may reflect an increasing desire on the part of 
                                                 
8 For a full description of these data see Millward et al., (2000:  248-255). 
9 The demise of union voice is also partly due to a positive association between unionisation and workplace 
closure in the 1990s (Bryson, 2003). 
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employers to deal with employees directly, rather than with unions.  Certainly, this was a 
view expressed by over half (54%) of managers in unionised workplaces in 1998.10  
 Also during the 1990s there was an inflow of 9.6% to non-union only voice within 
continuing workplaces.  However, 7.7% left non-union only status, indicating the volatility of 
this regime, a finding which may imply fewer switching costs than in the case of union 
regimes.  Cohort effects played a bigger part than behavioural change among continuing 
workplaces in the rise of non-union only voice in the 1990s (see below). 
 
5.2  Cohort effects 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, both the pre- and post-1980 cohorts experienced rapid increases 
in non-union only voice (17-33% in the case of the pre-1980 cohort, and 22-48% in the post-
1980 cohort) and the demise of union-only voice (falling from 25-13% in the pre-1980 cohort 
and from 21-6% in the post-1980 cohort).  But, throughout the period, non-union voice was 
more prevalent in the later cohort, while union-only voice was more prevalent in the earlier 
cohort.  The regression analysis in Table 3 indicates that the odds of a workplace having a 
union-only regime were 1.75 times lower than having non-union voice only and were 1.61 
times lower than having no voice where the workplace was set up after 1980.  Dummies for 
the year of the survey show that, controlling for set-up date, there has been a significant 
increase in the relative prevalence of the alternatives to union-only voice, a trend which, in 
the case of non-union voice, continued in the 1990s. 
 Another way into this cohort effect is to examine the incidence of voice regimes in the 
1984 data set by age of workplace.  This is shown in Table 4 below.  It suggests the incidence 
of non-union only regimes in 1984 was twice as high among workplaces aged under 25 years 
than it was among those aged 25 years or more.  Assuming that regimes were chosen early on 
in the lives of these workplaces, this would indicate a shift to non-unionism at the end of the 
1950s. 
 Our explanation is that normative pressures to avoid non-union only voice were high 
before 1960, possibly allied to the availability of institutions such as employer associations 
offering a ready alternative.  This made q ui   higher, i.e.  the risk of adopting union voice was 
                                                 
10 Compared to 86% in non-unionised workplaces.   These figures are based on managerial respondents to the 
Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 in all workplaces with 10 or more employees. 
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lower.  In workplaces founded after 1960, non-union only voice is much more likely 
indicating a decrease in q ui  relative to q Ni   . 
 By the 1990s, mimetic isomorphism occurred as non-union only regimes established 
themselves as the norm.  Indeed, the increase in solely non-union voice arrangements 
between 1990 and 1998 was largely accounted for by new workplaces adopting direct 
communication methods.  They were much more likely to have solely non-union voice than 
continuing workplaces and those which had left the population in the 1990s (Millward, et al., 
2000:  124-125).  These trends point to a conscious decision to adopt direct communication 
methods in preference to union-based representation.  The higher incidence of benchmarking 
among workplaces with non-union only regimes is also suggestive of mimetic practices.11 
 New entrants to the market are choosing the non-union route – almost irrespective of 
their characteristics (public vs.  private sector being something of an exception).12 Shift-share 
analyses indicate that, in the 1990s, nine-tenths of the lower rate of unionisation among new 
workplaces relative to workplaces leaving the population is due to different propensities to 
unionise, and only one-tenth is due to change in the composition of workplaces (Millward et 
al., 2000:  106-108). 
 Movement towards non-union voice can also be assessed by running multinomial 
regressions estimating the likelihood of the four voice regimes, splitting the analysis by year 
and looking at shifts in the coefficients over time.  This analysis points to the dominance of 
the cohort effect:  the coefficient on the set up date post 1980 increases over time for non-
union voice relative to union-only voice (in 1984  the odds are 1.04, t = 0.08; in 1990, odds 
are 1.98, t = 2.50; in 1998, odds are 2.10, t = 2.43).13   
 
5.3  First movers and asset specificicity 
 
We hypothesised that the incentive for being a first mover might be high asset specificity, as 
indicated by a high percentage of non-manual workers or foreign ownership.   
                                                 
11 Benchmarking is defined as ‘examining the was things are done at other workplaces comparing with this 
establishment’.  60% of workplaces with non-union only regimes had benchmarked, compared with 42% of 
union-only regimes and 54% of dual channel regimes. 
12 The public sector may be exceptional because the returns to adopting a regime compatible with high asset 
specificity are low. 
13 These models are not shown but are available from the authors.  Regressions control for broad sector, 
workplace size, foreign ownership, if single-establishment organisation, proportion of workforce part-time, 
proportion of workforce non-manual, set up post-1980, dummies for year of survey representing real time. 
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 There is some support for this among workplaces that were set up before 1960:  by 
1984, 14% of these workplaces had non-union only regimes where 25%+ of their workforce 
were non-manuals, compared with 8% among those with <25% non-manuals.  In keeping 
with the model, among those aged under 25 years in 1984, there was no difference between 
those with 25%+ non-manuals and those with <25% non-manuals (22% and 21% non-union 
voice only respectively). 
 Foreign-owned firms are higher on asset specificity, usually taking the form of a one-
shot innovation of technique or product, leading firms to internalise the advantage rather than 
license other firms (Te Velde, 2001).  For us, this one-shot innovation is on the labour 
management side.  Unionisation rates were lower in 1984 among foreign-owned workplaces 
set up pre-1960 than they were among domestically owned workplaces of the same vintage 
(47% versus 71%).  This is partly explained by a higher prevalence of non-union voice 
(19.3% versus 12.5%) and partly by higher ‘no voice’ (23.8% versus 16.4%).  In keeping 
with the model, there was no difference in the younger age group (57% versus 63%).   
 Private service workplaces were also first movers.  Among workplaces set up before 
1960, non-union only voice made up 25% of all private service workplace regimes in 1984, 
compared with 11% among private manufacturers and 1% of the public sector.  Among the 
younger workplaces in 1984 (those set up since 1960) non-union only voice made up 33% of 
private service workplaces, 31% of private manufacturing workplaces and 1% of public 
sector workplaces.   
 
5.4  Competition and risk 
 
Table 5 looks at the relationship between voice regime and product market competition.  The 
probability of non-union only regime rises with the degree of product market competition.  
With an increase in the number of competitors, the probability of any union involvement in 
voice – either through union-only or dual channel forms, decreases.  Of interest also is that 
the probability of ‘no voice’ also increases.  Further confirmation of this comes from Table 6 
which shows managers assessments in the 1998 survey of the degree of competition they face 
associated with non-union only voice regimes.  In turn, this confirms the findings of Millward 
and Forth (2002:  15-16) who show product market pressures – indicated by setting 
productivity targets and JIT inventory systems – are associated with increased likelihood of 
direct communications (part of the non-union voice regime).   
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6. Implications and Conclusions 
 
Our central concern in this paper has been to explain differences between voice regimes.  We 
have argued that differences can be explained in terms of employer decision making under 
uncertainty and have used British data from successive WERS surveys to apply this approach 
to explain a central feature of the evolution of voice regimes in Britain – the move towards 
non-union voice as part or all of a voice regime. 
 In the broadest terms, our picture of this shift is as follows.  Employers choosing 
voice regimes prior to 1960 did so in circumstances where union-based voice regimes were 
common exemplars and where there were normative and mimetic pressures to avoid non-
union only regimes.  The risk-averse option was dual channel voice.  Over time, 
compositional shift from manufacturing to services and inward investments by companies 
with higher levels of asset specificity offered examples of non-union only voice.  By the 
1990’s cohort effects dominate with almost all new entrants choosing non-union voice.  
Where union voice persists it is highly likely to do so as part of a dual channel voice regime. 
 Competition in the product market appears to encourage the shift towards non-union 
voice.  Traditionally, this would be interpreted as a rent issue; in competitive product markets 
rent sharing possibilities disappear and the benefits of unionisation for employees diminish.  
However, where union wage premia are disappearing we suggest that an explanation in terms 
of risk management by employers is at least worth considering – employers facing high 
product market risk seek to control labour supply risk through a voice-making decision. 
 Our conclusions are summarised in Figure 5 and Table 7.  Figure 5 depicts the 
declining costs of HRM provision in Britain over time, from the paradigmatic choice of union 
voice in the 1950s to the HRM dominated world of the 1990s.  This decline in the make 
curve - perhaps through the increasing availability of HRM professionals and the spread of 
HRM benchmarking available - had the effect of lowering the make/buy threshold for firms 
across all risk appetites (e.g. the move from point f to a amongst all risk seeking firms).  
Second, increasing product market risk shifted the risk appetite of firms away from 0-RS 
towards 0-RA, thus compounding the move away from union voice and towards HRM and 
dual channels.  We therefore suggest as the Table indicates that the default option in the 
choice of voice regime has shifted over time in the UK from union to non-union, from make 
to buy, according to changes in the values of risk and cost variables (we have assumed that 
returns were equal).  The presence of switching costs in our model, however, makes regime 
 18 
 
choice ‘sticky’ rendering radical switching (from union to non-union and vice versa) rare.  
This is also consistent with the evidence presented here. 
 Our findings can only be illustrative but we feel that the case for modelling employer 
decision making in order to explain voice regimes has been made.  It can only be partial and a 
fuller explanation would need to examine employee attitudes towards unions and indeed 
union policies themselves, particularly as they relate to the variables UiC   and  q 
u
i .   
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Table 1:  Union and Non-Union Voice Arrangements in Unionised Workplaces, 
1984 to 1998 
 
Column percentages 
 1984 1990 1998 
Type of voice arrangement (5 items)    
Union only  35 26 21 
Union and non-union 63 73 78 
Voice, but nature not reported 2 1 1 
    
Representative voice only 40 29 25 
Representative and direct voice 60 71 74 
Voice, but nature not reported 0 * 1 
    
Weighted base 1327 1053 845 
Unweighted base 1593 1416 1116 
Base:  all workplaces with 25 or more employees recognizing unions for pay bargaining.  
Union voice is defined as one or more recognized trade unions or a joint consultative 
committee meeting at least once a month with representatives chosen through union channels.  
Non-union voice defined as a joint consultative committee meeting at least once a month with 
representatives not chosen through union channels, regular meetings between senior 
management and the workforce, briefing groups. 
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Table 2:  Switches in Voice Regime, 1990 to 1998 
 
 
 
SHIFTERS  shifts in voice regime, 90-98 
28 3.1 3.1 3.1 
341 38.8 38.9 42.0 
219 24.8 24.9 66.9 
40 4.6 4.6 71.5 
70 8.0 8.0 79.5 
4 .5 .5 80.0 
2 .2 .2 80.1 
11 1.3 1.3 81.5 
33 3.7 3.7 85.2 
7 .8 .8 85.9 
1 .1 .1 86.0 
33 3.7 3.8 89.8 
33 3.8 3.8 93.6 
4 .5 .5 94.1 
5 .6 .6 94.6 
47 5.4 5.4 100.0 
879 99.8 100.0 
2 .2 
881 100.0 
1.00  union voice only 
2.00  dualc only 
3.00  non-u voice only 
4.00  no voice 
5.00  u only to dualc 
6.00  u only to non-u only 
7.00  u only to none 
8.00  dualc to u only 
9.00  dualc to non-u only 
10.00  dualc to none 
11.00  non-u only to u only 
12.00  non-u only to dualc 
13.00  non-u only to none 
14.00  none to u only 
15.00  none to dualc 
16.00  none to non-u only 
Total 
Valid 
System Missing 
Total 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
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Table 3:  Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimating Influences on Voice Regime, 
Pooled Data, 1984-1998 
 
Survey multinomial logistic regression 
 
pweight: weight Number of obs  =  5575 
Strata: <one> Number of strata  =  1 
PSU: <observations> Number of PSUs  =  5575 
  Population size  =  5700.756 
  F(  42,  5533)  =  19.72 
  Prob > F  =  0.0000 
 
tvoice1r RRR Std. Err. t P>|t| (95% Conf. Interval) 
dual channel       
public .706019 .1067352 -2.30 0.021 .524934 .9495724 
privmanu .6345687 .1096353 -2.63 0.009 .4522551 .8903768 
siz5099 .9813844 .1521692 -0.12 0.904 .7241473 1.329999 
si100199 1.050833 .1612202 0.32 0.747 .7778803 1.419562 
si200499 1.159674 .1868286 0.92 0.358 .8456171 1.590369 
si500999 1.141524 .2229997 0.68 0.498 .7783314 1.674193 
siz1000p  1.376782 .2858801 1.54 0.124 .91639 2.068475 
foreign 1.110458 .2606817 0.45 0.655 .7008711 1.759408 
single .4938635 .1018093 -3.42 0.001 .3296817 .739808 
proppt 2.967894 .9197073 3/51 0.000 1.61665 5.448547 
propnm 1.759603 .3403288 2/92 0.003 1.204331 2.570888 
supos802 .963104 .1768127 -0.20 0.838 .6720016 1.380308 
wirs1984 .5039311 .0991396 -3.48 0.000 .3426698 .7410824 
wirs1990 
 
.758202 .1482997 -1.42 0.157 .5167244 1.112528 
 
non-union 
      
public .0469282 .0105285 -13.64 0.000 .0302289 .0728526 
privmanu .6411452 .1281067 -2.22 0.026 .4333527 .9485741 
siz5099 .840811 .1475376 -.099 0.323 .5960808 1.186019 
si100199 .4974092 .0879721 -3.95 0.000 .3516714 .7035428 
si200499 .3351568 .0650134 -5.64 0.000 .2291379 .4902292 
si500999 .1895916 .0451655 -6.98 0.000 .1188495 .3024411 
siz1000p  .1786262 .0482815 -6.37 0.000 .1051528 .3034377 
foreign 1.561132 .3839281 1.81 0.070 .9639594 2.528252 
single 1.282701 .2535845 1.26 0.208 .870583 1.889909 
proppt 6.568184 2.465094 5.02 0.000 3.147118 13.70811 
propnm 3.490047 .8075267 5.40 0.000 2.217367 5.493195 
supos802 1.746652 .3403751 2.86 0.004 1.192049 2.559284 
wirs1984 .2166608 .0486221 -6.82 0.000 .1395454 .3363914 
wirs1990 
 
.5465941 .1169134 -2.82 0.005 .3593836 .8313266 
 
none 
      
public .0305251 .0110459 -9.64 0.000 .0150166 .0620499 
privmanu .9304635 .2071026 -0.32 0.746 .6014474 1.439465 
siz5099 .5421152 .1032986 -3.21 0.001 .3731317 .7876276 
si100199 .2637517 .0553329 -6.35 0.000 .1748161 .3979321 
si200499 .1332359 .0321273 -8.36 0.000 .0830473 .2137553 
si500999 .0933514 .0329297 -6.72 0.000 .0467514 .1864005 
siz1000p  .606628 .0321237 -5.29 0.000 .021482 .171305 
foreign 2.277203 .6258949 2.99 0.003 1.328605 3.903079 
single 2.202135 .4645606 3.74 0.000 1.456251 3.330058 
proppt 4.236837 1.807699 3.38 0.001 1.835638 9.779044 
propnm 2.357549 .6261289 3.23 0.001 1.400702 3.968039 
supos802 1.61095 .3492154 2.20 0.028 1.053227 2.464009 
wirs1984 .4655366 .1141317 -3.12 0.002 .28789 .7528027 
wirs1990 
 
.8125657 .1967312 -0.86 0.391 .5055084 1.306137 
(Outcome tvoice1r==union is the comparison group) 
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Table 4:  Incidence of Voice Regimes by Period of Workplace Establishment 
(Unconditional Firm Cohort Effect):  1984 WERS 
 
 Union voice Dual channel Non-union 
voice 
No voice 
Before 1960 .28 .43 .13 .17 
1960-1974 .23 .42 .22 .13 
1975-1984 .16 .42 .22 .20 
 
 
 
Table 5:  Voice and Competition 
 
svytab tvoice1r tcompet, col ; 
 
pweight: weight Number of obs = 2950 
Strata: <one> Number of strata =  1 
PSU: <observations> Number of PSUs = 2950 
  Population size  = 3219.9336 
 
 Number of competitors for (main) product/service 
tvoice1r none/dom a few (u  many            (6+ Total 
union .2959 .1169 .1121 .1277 
dual cha .3433 .2584 .264 .2683 
non-unio .2329 .3498 .3986 .3701 
none .1278 .275 .2253 .2339 
     
Total 1 1 1 1 
 
Key:  column proportions 
 
Pearson: 
 Uncorrected chi2(6) = 94.4224 
 Design-based F(5.68, 16745.83) = 7.3331 P = 0.0000 
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Table 6:  Voice and Competition 
 
 
 
Table 7:  Ranking of Voice Regime Risk and Cost Structures in Britain 
 
 
Voice Regime Cost and Risk Parameters 
 
(High-Med-Low ) 
   
Incidence of Voice 
Regime 
 
 
(Rank Order) 
 
Buy 
 
Dual 
 
Make 
 
Period  
 
Buy 
 
Dual 
 
 
Make 
 
 
q  
 
C 
 
S 
 
q  
 
C 
 
S 
 
q  
 
C 
 
S 
 
1970s 
 
2 
 
1 
 
3 
 
 
Med 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Med 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
1980s 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
 
Low 
 
Med 
 
High 
 
High 
 
 
High 
 
Med 
 
 
Med 
 
Med 
 
Low 
 
1990s 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
 
Med 
 
 
Med 
 
High 
 
Med 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Med 
 
q = Probability of voice regime success (inverse measure of risk 1- q); 
C = Cost of voice regime 
S  = Switching costs out of voice regime. 
(KDEGREE + BASE1) BY VOICE2 
32 39 47 48 6 
31 28 38 35 35 
15 6 5 9 23 
5 14 7 4 32 
17 11 3 3 4 
0 0   1   
0 1 0 0   
327 201 206 916 33 
355 454 244 543 23 
1  Very high 
2  High 
3  Neither high nor low 
4  Low 
5  Very low 
8  Not answered 
9  Dont know 
How would 
you assess 
the degree of 
competition in 
this market? 
Weighted 
Unweighted 
Base 
1.00  
union only 
2.00  dual 
channel, u 
and non-u 
3.00  
non-union 
only 
4.00  no 
voice 
9.00  
missing 
union and non-union rep voice, inc JCCs 
13 Jun 02 
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Figure 1:  Likelihood of Union or Non-Union Voice Based on Cross Classification of 
Employer, Union and Worker Preferences 
 
Employer Propensity to 
Accept Unionisation (E) 
Union Propensity to 
Organize Workplace (U) 
Employee Propensity to 
Join Union (M) 
Likely Voice Regime 
Outcome 
 
High (+) 
 
Union Voice 
 
High (+) 
 
Low  (-) 
 
Union Voice 
 
High (+) 
 
Union Vo ice 
 
High (+) 
 
Low  (-) 
 
Low  (-) 
 
Non-Union Voice* 
 
High (+) 
 
Union Voice* 
 
High (+) 
 
Low  (-) 
 
Non-Union Voice 
 
High (+) 
 
Non-Union Voice 
 
Low  (-) 
 
Low  (-) 
 
Low  (-) 
 
Non-Union Voice 
* Unstable employer preferences. 
 
 25 
Figure 2:  The Firm’s Make or Buy Decision in Three Possible States 
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Wage Premium 
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Wage Premium 
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CU 
CD 
CN 
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Figure 3:  Variable Risk, Asset Specificity and Regime Choice 
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Figure 4:  Voice Regime Choice in Britain: 1984 and 2001 
 
a) Probabilities in 1984 
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Figure 5:  The Paradigmatic Choice of Voice Regime in 1950s and 1990s Britain 
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